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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
REID D. BENCH and ALTA M. 1 
BENCH, has wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ERMA PACE, 
Defendant and Respondent. J 
Case No. 
13929 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE TYPE OF CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of a writ-
ten Lease Option Agreement wherein plaintiffs purchased 
from defendant a 120 acre farm located in Duchesne 
County, State of Utah. The defendant refused to convey 
a fee title to the property daiming that under the terms 
of an anal agreement entered into by the parties at the 
time of the execution of the written document, it was 
agreed the mineral rights to the property would be re-
served to the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court admitted into evidence the alleged 
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oral agreement and other extrinsic evidence, and other 
parol evidence overruling plaintiffs' objection and motion 
to strike, and based upon said evidence, reformed the 
written document to include a reservation of the mineral 
rights to defendant. Further, the court ruled that plain-
tiffs did not exercise the option in accordance with the 
written agreement and entered Judgment restoring pos-
session of the property to defendant and damages of 
reasonable rental value. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the decision and Judgment 
entered by the trial court in reforming the written Lease 
Option Agreement and for a Judgment by this Court 
granting plaintiffs specific performance of said writ-
ten Lease Option Agreement and awarding to plaintiffs 
fee simple title to the property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 8, 1965, Reid D. Bench and Alia M. 
Bench, his wife, as Buyers, entered into a Lease-Sales 
Contract (Ex. 2) with Erma Pace and Aaron Pace as 
Owners. The subject matter of the Lease-Sales Contract 
was a certain irrigated farm located approximately 10 
miles northwest of the City of Roosevelt, Utah. The 
contract described the property more particularly as 
follows: 
" N E % N E *4; Section 28, T. 1 S., R. 
2W., U.S.M. and also E % SE %; Section 21, 
T. 1 S., R. 2W., U.S.M." 
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The contract provided certain terms for a three year 
lease from the date of the execution of the contract. It 
also provided that the Buyers would have the option to 
purchase the farm and put forth the terms and conditions 
of that purchase. Included among those terms and con-
ditions were the total price of the purchase, that the 
down-payment should not be less than $2,000.00> that the 
interest rate would be 5% annually on the unpaid bal-
ance, the minimum annual payment, that title insurance 
should be furnished by the Sellers, that certain personal-
ty was to go with the farm, that certain plants could be 
dug up should the option not be exercised, and that 
balloon payments could be made to reduce the principal 
balance due more rapidly. 
On May 22, 1967, Erma Pace and Reid Bench en-
tered into a Lease-Extension Agreement extending the 
time for the exercise of the option for five additional 
years, making the date of expiration of the option Sep-
tember, 1973 (Ex. 16) 
On January 8, 1971, Mr. Bench exercised his option 
to purchase the land by tendering the $2,000.00 require-
ment along with back rental payments. (Exs. 15, 18) 
The check for $2,000.00 as well as the other checks were 
endorsed and deposited by Mrs. Pace. (R. 85) 
Subsequent to that tender, a dispute arose between 
the parties. That dispute is summarized in a letter signed 
by John C. Beaslin, Erma Pace's lawyer, dated April 
5, 1971, in which the following was communicated to Mr. 
Bench: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"This letter is to advise you that Mrs. Pace 
has contacted this office with reference to an 
apparent misunderstanding with reference to 
your letter dated September 8, 1965, and your 
subsequent extension of that lease agreement 
by the parties. 
Pursuant to the terms of the lease and 
your paying the $2,000.00 please be advised 
that this does not constitute a sale of the prop-
erty, and it will be necessary and mandatory 
if you want to proceed to exercise the option 
provision of your lease that the same will have 
to be converted to a sale of the 120 acres. Also, 
pursuant to the escrow agreement which Mr. 
Sam prepared, and which you have a copy of, 
would have to be executed or you will merely 
continue on with the lease until the same ex-
pires by its terms, which would be September 
15, 1973. 
If you want to exercise the option to pur-
chase the property, then it will be necessary 
that you either sign the escrow agreement and 
place the same at the bank, together with a 
deed from Mrs. Pace to be delivered upon the 
payment of the contract amount in full, or, 
it will be construed that you have not in fact 
bought the property. 
I t is going to necessitate your paying more 
than $1,000.00 per year on the unpaid balance 
of the contract, or, as you stated to Mrs. Pace, 
you would never pay for the property. Would 
you, therefore, please advise this office either 
personally or through your attorney as to how 
you want to complete the transaction with Mrs. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Pace. I await your reply with reference to this 
matter." (Ex. 7) 
The escrow agreement referred to in Mr. Beaslin's 
letter, (Ex. 6), had, prior to that time, been examined 
by Mr. Bench, and he commented about it to Mr. Beaslin 
in a letter dated April 12, 1971, wherein he said: 
"I have not signed the papers prepared 
by Mr. Sam because these terms are being 
changed. The papers prepared by Mr. Sam 
make no reference at all to the original Lease 
Purchase Agreement completely ignoring the 
facts there . . . I will take a day off this week 
and contact Mrs. Pace and/or yourself to see 
if this misunderstanding can be resolved." 
(Ex. 8) 
After negotiations for settlement between the parties 
were unsuccessful, Mrs. Pace sent a letter dated June 2, 
1971, indicating to Mr. Bench that his tender had been 
refused. That letter notified him that he was now back 
on the lease basis of the contract and told him that he 
owed various amounts of money for rent accrued since 
the time of the tender. (Ex. 17) 
In reply to the letter of June 2, 1971, Mr. Bench 
sent to Mrs Pace the sums of money she claimed he owed 
for rental and other items. In the letter he sent accom-
panying those payments, he made this statement: 
" I t is only our desire and intention to pur-
chase the farm per our original lease purchase 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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agreement and the terms there outlined." (Ex. 
10) 
Being unable to reach any sort of negotiated settle-
ment, this action was commenced on the 30th day of 
November, 1972, prior to the expiration date for the ex-
ercise of the option. 
At trial counsel for the defendant introduced parol 
evidence and other extrinsic evidence over the objection 
of counsel for the plaintiffs as to the intention of the 
parties at the time of the execuition of the original Lease 
S&les Contract. Mrs. Pace claimed that at the time of 
signing the Lease Sales Contract the parties had agreed 
that the oil and mineral rights were to be reserved to 
her and her son, Aaron. (R. 78) As the pleadings to 
this action indicate, this evidence was to show that there 
was either a fraud perpetrated by Mr. Bench at the ex-
pense of Mrs, Pace or that the parties were mutually 
mistaken as to the content of that contract. 
As to hear intent or understanding at the time of the 
execution of the Lease-Sales Contract, Mrs. Pace testi-
fied as follows: 
"Q. You were aware very early in the 
proceedings of the failure to have the reserva-
tion of oil and gas rights in the document, were 
you not? 
A. I was aware that it should have been 
in there before I ever signed it." (R-110) 
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Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the introduction of 
testimony of various witnesses as to any and all oral con-
versations and any other extrinsioe evidence in which 
plaintiffs purportedly conceded the oil and gas rights 
were to be reserved to defendant and her son, Aaron. 
The grounds for this series of objections and the motion 
to strike at the conclusion of the case were as follows: 
(R. 154-159) 
1. The contract on its face was complete and 
unambiguous and the testimony was not of-
fered for the purpose of, nor did it purport to 
explain any ambiguity within the instrument. 
2. No evidence was before the court, nor 
was any evidence introduced upon which a 
finding of mutual mistake of fact or fraud 
could be made, and without such evidence no 
sufficient foundation was laid which would 
make such testimony admissible. 
3. The Utah Statute of Frauds, Section 
25-1-1 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, prevents the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence to a clear and 
unambiguous contract or conveyance of real 
property. 
4. The Utah Statute of Limitations for the 
claiming of a fraud or mistake, Sections 78-
12-25 and 78-12-26(3) of the Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as amended, and laches prevents 
defendant from raising those defenses at this 
late date. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LEASE SALES CONTRACT CON-
VEYED A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY DESCRIBED, INCLUDING ALL 
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS. 
There can be no question that the Lease Sales Con-
tract constituted a conveyance subjecting the parties to 
all rights and liabilities pertaining to conveyances, and 
the court below has not ruled differently. 
Section 57-1-1, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides: 
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this 
title shall be construed to embrace every in-
instrument in writing by which any real estate, 
or interest in real estate is created, aliened, 
mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except 
wills and leases for a term not exceeding one 
year." (Emphasis added) 
The Lease Sales Contract signed and executed by the 
parties provides in part as follows: 
"This agreement made and entered into 
this 8th day of September, 1965 between Erma 
Pace and Aaron Pace hereinafter referred to 
as the owners and Reid D. Bench and Alta 
M. Bench, hereinafter referred to as the Buy-
ers, whereby the Owners have agreed to 
L E A S E and subsequently S E L L to the buy-
ers that certain one hundred twenty (120) acre 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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irrigated farm located approximately ten miles 
northwest of the city of Roosevelt, County of 
Duchesne, state of U T A H , and more partic-
ularly described as follows: 
N E % N E *4; Sec. 28, T. IS., R. 2W., 
U.S.M. and also E Vi SE ; Sec. 21, T. IS., 
R. 2WU.S.M." (Exhibit 2) 
The foregoing language wherein the owners agreed 
to lease and subsequently sell "that certain one hundred 
twenty (120) acre irrigated fetrcn * * * more par-
ticularly desoriibed as follows:" with no reservation of 
any rights, gives rise to a clear presumption that the 
Seller has conveyed a fee simple estate in the property. 
Section 57-1-3, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, reads as fol-
lows: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be in-
tended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, 
unless it appears from the conveyance that a 
lesser estate was intended." (Emphasis added) 
It is equally clear from the language of the statute 
that the presumption that a fee simple title is intended 
to pass cannot be rebutted "unless it appears from the 
conveyance that a lesser estate was intended." See: 
Russell v. Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Company, 18 U. 
2d 363, 423 P. 2d 487 (1967). 
In the case at bar the defendant has conceded not 
only that the conveyance does not purport to convey 
a lesser estate than a fee simple title, but that she was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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well aware of the fact before she ever signed the docu-
ment. She testified: 
"Q. You were aware very early in the pro-
ceedings of the failure to have the reservation 
of oil and gas rights in the document, were you 
not? 
A. I was aware that it should have been 
in there before I ever signed it." (R. 110; see 
also R. 104-105) 
The common law rule supports the Utah statutory 
rule and is likewise to the effect that a general convey-
ance without an exception or reservation of the minerals 
therein passes the mineral rights as well as the surface 
rights and that a severance occurs only by clear and dis-
tinct wording in the conveyance. 
In 54 Am. Jur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, Section 108, 
the rule is set forth as follows: 
"A general conveyance of land without 
any exception or reservation of the minerals 
therein carries with it the minerals as well as 
the surface. A severance occurs only by clear 
and distinct wording in the conveyance. Until 
such a severance occurs, the ownership of the 
surface carries with it the ownership of the un-
derlying minerals." 
And in 58 C. J. S., Mines and Minerals, Section 134, it 
is said: 
"However, in the absence of a separate 
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grant or conveyance thereof, minerals in place 
belong to the owner of the surface of the land 
beneath which they lie, and pass with it by 
deed, gift or other form of conveyance." 
And, again, in Section 146: 
"In accordance with such rules, a general 
conveyance of land with minerals, without any 
exception or reservation, passes to the pur-
chaser or his heirs and assigns the whole in-
terest of the vendor in the property described. 
"A conveyance of land passes all minerals 
therein, where it contains an express provision 
to that effect and, even though it does not con-
tain such a provision or specification, it is well 
settled at common law that a general convey-
ance of land without an exception or reserva-
tion of the minerals therein, or language show-
ing that the title to minerals is not intended 
to pass, will carry the grantor's right to, and 
interest in, all coal, oil, gas and other minerals 
in the land." (Emphasis added) 
See also: LeBard v. Richfield Oil, 364 P. 2d 449 
(Cal. 1961); Voyta v. Clouts, 328 P. 2d 655 (Mont. 1958). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ALLOW-
ING PAROL EVIDENCE ADMITTED AS 
TO AN ORAL U N D E R S T A N D I N G OR 
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES TO RE-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SERVE OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS 
TO RESPONDENT WHICH WAS NOT CON-
TAINED IN THE WRITTEN LEASE SALES 
AGREEMENT. 
A. Statement of the Law. 
The law is clear and unequivocal that unless there 
is evidence of fraud or mutual mistake of fact, oral evi-
dence will not be allowed for the purpose of varjdng the 
clear and unambiguous terms of a written instrument. 
Judge Sorenson of the Fourth Judicial District ren-
dered a decision in the case of E. A. Strout Western 
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Owen H. Broderick, U. 2d 
, 522 P. 2d 144, (1974), which was reversed for an 
improper interpretation of the parol evidence rule. The 
appeal in that case was from a judgment against the 
plaintiff and in favor of the defendant on a law action 
to recover a real estate broker's commission based on an 
exclusive listing agreement. The disputed language of 
the contract was as follows: 
"If a buyer or transferee ready, willing 
and able to buy or exchange for this property 
is procured by you or by anyone else, including 
myself, I agree to pay you a commission of 
6% of the selling price, or a minimum com-
mission of $200.00, whichever is greater." 
The defendant persuaded the trial court, by the use 
of parol evidence, that the language above was not cor-
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rect and that he agreed to pay a commission only in case 
the plaintiff sold the home. 
This Court reversed the trial court with the follow-
ing holding: 
"Parole evidence may be received to clari-
fy ambiguous language in a contract, to show 
what the agreement was relative to filling in 
blanks, and to supply omitted terms which were 
agreed upon but inadvertently left out of the 
written agreement. However, under the gen-
eral rule, which is applicable here, parole evi-
dence may not be given to change the terms 
of a written agreement which are clear, defi-
nite, and unambiguous. To permit that would 
be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all con-
tracts and to leave a party to a solemn agree-
ment at the mercy of uncertainties of oral 
testimony given by one who in the subsequent 
light of events discovers that he made a bad 
bargain. 
Written words can be examined so as to 
ascertain what they stand for in connection 
with particular conduct or particular objects. 
Thus expressions of the parties prior to and 
contemporaneous with the execution of a writ-
ten instrument may be helpful in understand-
ing the meaning of the language used. How-
ever, the defendant here does not seek to ex-
plain the meaning of a paragraph. He simply 
wants the court to eliminate it in its entirety. 
This the courts cannot do." (Emphasis added) 
The case of Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 
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P. 2d 769 (1969), involved a suit between stockholders, 
and the defendants asserted they were not personally 
liable and wanted to introduce evidence to support that 
claim. In affinning the trial court's ruling of Summary 
Judgment, the court stated: 
"We must agree with respondent that ap-
pellants are trying to vary the terms of the 
written agreement by parol evidence, i.e., to 
establish a different contract on facts known at 
the time of reducing their understanding to a 
written form. 
* * * The rule is well settled that, where 
the parties have reduced to writing what ap-
pears to be a complete and certain agreement, 
it will, in the absence of fraud, be conclusively 
presumed that the writing contained the whole 
of the agreement between the parties, that it 
is a complete memorial of such agreement, and 
that parol evidence of contemporaneous con-
versations, representations, or statements will 
not be received for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of the written document. 
The action of the trial court in the instant 
case must be sustained, since appellants' af-
fidavit consisted entirely of inadmissible parol 
evidence, submitted for the purpose of varying 
and adding to the terms of the written agree-
ment of the parties." 
In Jensen v. Rice, 7 U. 2d 276, 322 P. 2d 259 (1958), 
plaintiff brought an action to recover the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price of an automobile after sale at pub-
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lie auction following default in payment. Although the 
defendant urged that he meant to enter into a different 
contract and that he did not contract as alleged, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the enforcement of the contract 
as written. This case is striking in its parallels to the 
case currently before the court. The court stated: 
"As to the contentions that defendant did 
not contract as alleged or that he executed a 
different contract, both are refuted by, and are 
inconsistent with defendant's signature on the 
contract and his admitted knowledge of its 
terms. Punctuated by objection, his testimony 
was diametrically opposed to the manifesta-
tion of mutual assent reflected in his execution 
of an instrument whose terms were clear, un-
ambiguous, understandable and known. 
Elementary it is that in construing con-
tracts we seek to determine the intentions of 
the parties. But it is also elementary and of 
extreme practical importance that we hold con-
tracting parties to their clear and understand-
able language deliberately committed to writ-
ing and endorsed by them as signatories there-
to. Were this not so business, one with another 
among our citizens, would be relegated to the 
chaotic, and the rules of conduct for the main-
tenance and improvement of an orderly so-
ciety's welfare and progress would find itself 
impotent. I t is not unreasonable to hold one 
responsible for language which he himself 
espouses. Such language is the only implement 
he gives us to fashion a determination as to the 
intentions of the parties. Under such circum-
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stances we should not be required to embosom 
any request that we ignore that very language. 
This is as it should be. The rule excluding mat-
ters outside the four corners of a clear, under-
standable document, is a fair one, and one's 
contentions concerning his intent should ex-
tend no further than his own clear expressions. 
I t was urged correctly that to admit mat-
ters outside a contract would do violence to the 
principle that one is bound by his manifesta-
tions of assent, and that, irrespective of such 
contention, such matters properly are exclud-
able by the parol evidence rule, —which rule, 
counsel suggests, is one of substantive law rath-
er than one of evidence. Whatever kind one 
calls it, the rule that excludes such evidence is 
a common sense rule." (Emphasis added) 
The case of Robert D. Davison, et al. v. Arnold B. 
Robbins, et aL, 30 U. 2d 338, 517 P. 2d 1026, (1973), was 
an action by plaintiff for specific performance to purchase 
real property. The agreement in question provided that 
the offer was "conitingent upon buyer's approval of net 
acreage description." The trial court permitted the buy-
ers to introduce parol evidence to describe the net acre-
age and granted specific performance. In reversing the 
trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court held that the 
agreement constituted a mere expression to make a con-
tract in the future and reversed the decision. 
In discussing parol evidence, the court stated as fol-
lows: 
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"Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not 
to supply, a description of lands in a contract. 
Parol evidence will not be admitted to com-
plete a defective description, or to show the 
intention with which it was made. Parol evi-
dence may be used for the purpose of identify-
ing the description contained in the writing 
with its location upon the ground, but not for 
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the 
land about which the parties negotiated, and 
supplying a description thereof which they 
have omitted from the writing. There is a clear 
distinction between the admission of oral and 
extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identify-
ing the land described and applying the de-
scription to the property and that of supply-
ing and adding to a description insufficient and 
void on its fact'/ (Emphasis added) 
In the case of William R. Clyde v. Eddington Can-
ning Company and W. R. Eddington, 10 U. 2d 14, 347 
P. 2d 563, (1959) „, the defendant attempted to explain 
that he was not to be personally liable for the agreement. 
In affirming the Summary Judgment, the court stated: 
"Defendant contends that by signing the 
letter in the form indicated it was not his in-
tention to be bound personally. He so averred 
in an affidavit upon which the matter was de-
termined. Under the clear language of the writ-
ing we are not impressed with such conten-
tion, particularly since intentions cannot vary 
the terms of clear, concise, unambiguous Ian-
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guage employed by him who says he did not 
intend what he said." (Emphasis added) 
Lenman v. Jones, 222 U. S. 51, 32 S. Ct. 18; involved 
specific performance of a land contract. The seller re-
fused to perform the agreement alleging that the buyers 
failed to disclose the real parties who were involved in 
the transaction. The trial court granted Summary Judg-
ment, and Justice Holmes in affirming, stated as follows: 
" I t is apparent from her own testimony 
that she knew that Mrs. Wilhoite was only a 
figurehead, and the most that can be contend-
ed is that she thought that another person, not 
the appellee, most probably was the real man. 
I t does not matter that she did. She suffered 
no loss, and, moreover, Mr. Jones and his com-
pany were under no obligation to disclose their 
interest, in the absence of fraud, which there 
is not the slightest ground to suggest. It also is 
urged that the defendant, when she signed the 
instrument, thought that it merely gave an op-
tion. This is an immaterial afterthought. If she 
did not know what she was doing, she had only 
herself to thank, but no even one-sided mistake 
is proved." (Emphasis added) 
See also: Hatch v. Adams, 7 U. 2d 73, 318 P. 2d 633; 
Rehearing Opinion, 8 U. 2d 82, 329 P. 2d 285 (1958). 
B. The Lease Sales Contract is clear and unambig-
uous on its face and the trial court has in effect 
so ruled. 
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The Lease Sales Contract as executed by the parties 
on the 8th day of September, 1965, described by legal 
description the one hundred twenty acre irrigated farm 
which was the subject of the contract, the consideration 
to be paid in the event the option was exercised, and 
the due dates and manner of payment. It required the 
Seller to furnish title insurance, listed the personal prop-
erty that went with the land, and concluded by giving 
the Buyer the option of making accelerated payments to 
reduce the principal balance due. There is no claim of 
ambiguity as to any of these terms, and no effort was 
made by defendant to explain them. (Exhibit 2) 
The only contention made by defendant is that the 
contract did not contain a claimed unwritten oral under-
standing to reserve the oil and gas rights. Said conten-
tion does not amount to an ambiguity. It amounts only 
to an omission, and it most certainly does not amount 
to the inadvertent omission to include terms that were 
previously agreed upon but not included in a written 
contract as contemplated in E. A. Strout Western Realty 
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, supra. Mrs, Pace acknowl-
edged on cross examination that the Lease Sales Agree-
ment which was signed by her and her son, Aaron, was 
circulated among all those present at the time of execu-
tion; that she and her son read it from beginning to end; 
that there was no effort whatsoever to make any changes; 
and, most importantly, in three different places in the 
cross-examination she affirmatively stated that she knew 
at the time the contract was signed that it contained no 
reservation and did not purport to contain any reserva-
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tion of oil, gas and mineral rights. (R. 103-104, 110) 
Therefore, such an omission comes within the language of 
Section 57-1-3 of the Utah Code and provisions of the 
Parol Evidence Rule. 
The court below has in effect ruled by adding to 
the Contract a reservation of oil, gas and mineral rights 
and not interpreting the meaning of the contract that 
the Lease Sales Contract, (Exhibit 2), is clear and un-
ambiguous on its face. (See Conclusion of Law, para-
graphs 1 and 3; Findings of Fact, paragraphs 1 and 4.) 
The above contention is further placed beyond doubt 
by an examination of the prayer for relief in defendant's 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim dated No-
vember 1, 1973. Paragraph B shows that defendant 
framed the issue clearly for the court. There, defendant's 
primary claim was for an interpretation of the Contract 
in question and only in the alternative was there a prayer 
for a reformation to conform to the alleged oral under-
standing of the parties. The pertinent language is as 
follows: 
"For declaratory relief interpreting the 
Agreement to exclude gas, oil and mineral 
rights or, in the alternative, for reformation 
of the Agreement to conform to the under-
standing of the parties, thereby excluding gas, 
oil and mineral rights." 
The court below granted the alternative disregarding the 
primary prayer. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOW-
ING THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
ANY ORAL AGREEMENT OR AGREE-
MENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, ANY 
ORAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS, AND 
ANY OTHER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE PRI-
OR TO, CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH, OR 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXECUTION OF 
THE LEASE SALES CONTRACT OVER THE 
OBJECTION THAT SUCH EVIDENCE IS 
CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR AND PRECISE 
TERMS OF THE UTAH STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
At best, the claimed oral agreement between plain-
tiffs and defendant that at some future date Appellants 
would perform the necessary acts to effectuaite a transfer 
of title to the oil, gas and mineral rights back to Defen-
dant, would be unenforceable as a violation of the Stat-
ute of Frauds. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, U. C. A. 
1953, states: 
"Estate or interest in real property. No 
estate or interest in real property . . . shall be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation of 
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing sub-
scribed by the party creating, granting, assign-
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ing, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writ-
ing." (Emphasis added) 
The application of the Statute of Frauds to the case 
at hand is beet summarized in 37 Am. Jur. 2d 110, Fraud 
and Deceit, in which the authors cite Papanickolas v. 
Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856 (1929), to stand for 
the proposition that: 
"* * * A number of cases state or indi-
cate that the mere refusal to perform (an) oral 
promise is not of itself a fraud for which an 
action will lie, since in such a case the promisor 
has not, in a legal sense, made a contract, and 
hence has the right, both in law and in equity, 
to refuse to perform. It has been said that to 
allow an action on an unkept promise in some 
instances is to enforce an oral promise, contrary 
to the policy of the legislature as declared in the 
Statute of Frauds. It has also been stated that 
an action brought upon such a promise will be 
considered one brought on an unenforceable 
contract, rather than a maintainable one in tort 
or deceit where the damages claimed showed 
that in its essence the action was attempted to 
be premised upon a breach of the promise fall-
ing within the statute (of Frauds)." 
Also, the operation of the Statute of Frauds is not 
confined to cases where an action is brought directly on 
the contract, and whatever the form of the acts may be, 
if proof of a promise or contract within the statute is 
essential to maintain it, there can be no recovery unless 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
the statute is satisfied. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 U. 2d 386, 
295 P. 2d 386 (1956). 
Of course, the parol evidence argument made previ-
ously applies to all written contracts. However, in the 
case of a contract dealing with the conveyance of an 
interest in real property, the Statute of Frauds is de-
signed to add an additional stricture on the ability of 
one contesting the terms of the contract to introduce ex-
trinsic evidence to vary the terms contained therein. It 
is not enough to say "I thought it was understood" (R. 
104) when there is no dodbt that the person attempting 
to vary the terms of the contract had read the entire 
contract,, knew that the contract did not purport to re-
serve any oil, gas and mineral rights to her, made no 
attempt in writing to change the terms of that contract, 
and signed that contract without complaint. (R. 110) 
It is also interesting to note that Aaron Pace, who was 
a co-signer of the Lease Sales Agreement and a tenant in 
common with the defendant, gave no testimony at trial 
whatsoever cx>ncerning any mistake that either he or his 
mother made at the time of the signing of the document. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted to this Court 
that the Statute of Frauds, in and of itself, bars any 
admission of the extrinsice evidence that has heretofore 
been mentioned. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN 
HER BURDEN OF PROVING FRAUD ON 
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THE PART OF PLAINTIFFS BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, AND THE 
COURT BELOW HAS IN ESSENCE SO 
RULED. 
In defendant's Second Amended Answer and Coun-
terclaim dated November 1, 1973, under Third Defense, 
paragraph 4, is the following contention: 
"If the said Contract fails to reflect the 
agreement of the parties, such failure is due 
either to mutual mistake, to mistake in draft-
ing, or to fraud on the part of Plaintiffs aris-
ing from their intentional attempt to deprive 
Defendant of her property rights without just 
compensation and through deception in the 
preparation of the said Lease Option Agree-
ment." 
Throughout the proceedings in this action, the claim 
of fraud has been the primary contention of defendant 
in her defense. This is borne out in the closing state-
ments of counsel at the trial wherein Mr. Boyden stated 
the following: 
"Mr. Boyden * * * Now then whether this 
develops into fraud raises another question. 
If this man is telling this woman that he 
doesn't want the minerals he just wants to get 
his family away from the city, and then he goes 
down and tells a lawyer I want to protect 
whatever right I have in the minerals, then 
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we are gettin gto a point where he is talking 
out of both sides of his mouth. 
The Court: Is that fraud? 
Mr. Boyden: I t is fraud, because he is rep-
resenting to her what his intention is. H e is 
expecting her to rely upon it, and she does rely 
upon it, and now he brings an equitable action 
to try and enforce the lies which he has told 
her, and that is fraud with every example that 
you can place under the books with all the tests. 
This in essence your Honor is our case. * * *" 
(R. 185) 
With that emphasis on the question of fraud, the 
trial court in its Conclusions of Law and Findings of 
Fact made no mention whatsoever of any remedial fraud. 
Therefore, the intent of the trial court is dear in finding 
that defendant failed in her burden to show by clear 
and convincing evidence that a fraud had been com-
mitted. Nevertheless, because of the trial court's omis-
sion to rule directly on the question of fraud, it is im-
portant at this point that the issue be briefed. 
A. Burden of proof. 
The burden is on defendant to prove each and every 
element of fraud by dear and convincing evidence. See: 
Pace, et al. v. Parrish, et al., 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273, 
(1952); Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Sohm, et al. 
v. Nickles, 15 U. 2d 262, 391 P. 2d 293, (1964); Schow v. 
Gmrdtone, 18 U. 2d 135, 417 P. 2d 643, (1966). 
B. The elements of fraud. 
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The leading Utah case setting forth the various ele-
ments of common-law fraud is that of Stuck, et al. v. 
Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791, 
(1924). There the court stated: 
"The principles referred to are more terse-
ly stated in 26 C.J. 1062, cited by appellant, 
from which we quote the following: ' I t may be 
stated generally that the elements of actual 
fraud consist of: (1) A representation; (2) Its 
falsity; (3) Its materiality; (4) The speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its 
truth; (5) His intent that it should be acted 
upon by the person and in the manner reason-
ably contemplated; (6) The hearer's ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) His reliance upon its truth; 
(8) His right to rely thereon; (9) His conse-
quent and proximate injury." 
See also: Pace, et al. v. Parrish, et al., supra; Oberg v. 
Sanders, et al, 111 Utah 507, 184 P. 2d 229, (1947) and 
Estate Counseling Service v. Merril, Lynch, Pierce, etc., 
303 F. 2d 527 (C. A. 10, 1962). 
A consideration of the elements of fraud in the light 
of the evidence adduced in this case will quickly demon-
strate how far short defendant has fallen in sustaining 
her burden of proof. 
Element 1: A representation of a present existing 
fact. 
To constitute "actionable fraud," the false represen-
tation must relate to past or present fact and not be 
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merely promissory or the expression of an opinion. See: 
Adamson, et ux. v. Brockbank, et al.y 122 Utah 52, 185 
P. 2d 264, (1947); Schow v. Guardtone, supa. 
Clearly, the only possible misrepresentation Bench 
could have made, taking defendant's highly questionable 
evidence at its best, was promissory in nature and re-
lated to a future event that may or may not occur; to-wit, 
the exercising of the option. It is interesting to note 
that the notary public was a cousin of defendant (R. 101) 
that the lawyer who prepared the document had been 
known by defendant for a lifetime (R. 100), that defen-
dant's son and daughter-in-law were present at the read-
ing and signing of the document (R. 103), that all that 
needed to be done was to interline a reservation of oil 
and gas rights if that was so important, that defendant 
was well aware that the document contained no such 
reservation (R. 103-104), that no effort was made to 
reserve oil and gas rights by defendant until over six 
years after the Lease Sales Contract had been signed (R. 
106-107), and that at the time of the execution of the 
contract there was no oil and gas activity whatsoever in 
the Duchesne County (R. 99); and all this in the face 
of defendant's burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that at the time of signing, plaintiff had an 
insidious and evil intent to cheat and defraud defendant 
by deliberately omitting the reservation of oil and gas 
rights from the contract. 
Element 2: Its falsity. 
"I t is also the majority rule that an in-
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sured is under a duty to read his application 
before signing it, and will be considered bound 
by a knowledge of the contents of his signed 
application. This is merely an application of 
fundamental contract law." Theros v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, 17 U2d 205, 
407P2d685, (1965). 
No contention has ever been made that the contract 
itself contains any false statement. As a matter of fact, 
as we have pointed out, defendant read the contract be-
fore signing same and was fully aware of and alert to the 
fact that the contract contained no reservation of oil and 
gas rights. (R. 103-104) The only claim of falsity has 
to do with a claim that plaintiff subjectively intended 
to cheat defendant out of her oil and gas rights at a 
time when he was orally assuring her that they were 
hers — all this at a time when she was signing a docu-
ment that did not contain such reservations and at a 
time when she was fully aware of this fact. This is simply 
not the kind of falsity, even assuming it to exist, that 
supports the requirements of proof of the cases we are 
citing in this brief. 
Element 3: Its materiality. 
In order for a misrepresentation to be material, it 
must go to "the very essence" of the transaction and be 
the "very ground" on which the transaction has taken 
place. See Kerr, Fraud and Mistake,, 73; Hart v. Laitz, 
72 Colo. 315, 211 P. 391, (1922). 
In this connection we point out that plaintiff had 
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only lived in the Roosevelt area for a few weeks. (R. 10) 
He knew absolutely nothing about oil and gas rights 
and had had no experience in matters of this kind. (R. 
154) We also call attention of the court to the testimony 
of defendant that "no drilling or exploration" whatso-
ever was going on in the area at the time — "no oil 
boom." (R. 99) 
Element 4: The speaker's knowledge of its falsity 
or ignorance of its truth. 
Unless fraudulent intent exists when alleged prom-
ises and representations are made, they will not consti-
tute fraud for which action at law for deceit may be 
maintained. Papinolzolas, et al. v. Sampson, et a/., 274 
P. 857, (1929); Schow v. Guardtone, supra. 
Element 5: His intent that it should be acted upon 
by the person and in the manner reasonably contem-
plated. 
In this connection again, it is clear from the evidence 
that Bench had no knowledge of oil and gas potentials 
on the farm. (R. 154) He was a new-comer to the area 
and totally unsophisticated in business matters. (R. 10) 
A local attorney prepared the Lease Sales Contract. (R. 
9) There is no evidence to controvert the inference that 
all defendant need to have done, if such was the intent 
of the parties, was to ask that the reservation be included 
in the document. This she did not do. The notary was 
a stranger to Bench and the cousin of Pace. (R. 101) 
Under such circumstances, it is clear that defendant has 
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failed in her burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that Bench made misrepresentations and in-
tended that she act upon them. Yet, such would have to 
to be the case under the requirement of Element 5 if 
defendant is to prevail on her claim of fraud. 
Element 6: The hearer's ignorance of its falsity. 
Here again, the falsity would have to be the sub-
jective intent of Bench to exclude the oil and gas rights 
and to have Erma Pace rely upon his oral assurances that 
this was an oversight, and that he would protect her, and 
her ignorance of his malicious intention to deceive. It 
is clear from her own testimony that defendant knew 
that the contract contained no oil and gas rights reser-
vation, and thus, that she had full knowledge of all ma-
terial facts. (R. 104-105, 110) 
Element 7: Her reliance upon its truth. 
The interesting thing here is that the Lease Sales 
Contract was signed on September 8, 1965. (Ex. 2) The 
Lease Extension was signed on May 22, 1967. (Ex. 16) 
The letter exercising the Option and the cashier's check 
were delivered to defendant on January 8, 1971, (Exs. 
15 & 18) and not until the new proposed Escrow Agree-
ment of Sams (Ex. 6) was presented in May, 1971, was 
any effort made to reform the original agreement and to 
exclude oil and gas rights from the purchase. (R. 107) 
Yet, defendant had the agreement in her possession all 
this time, and all this time was aware, by her own ad-
mission, of the fact said document did not reserve these 
rights to her. (R. 104) 
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Element 8: Her right to rely thereon. 
(See Statute of Frauds argument.) 
We believe that the most important failure of proof 
on the part of defendant has to do with her right of re-
liance. The facts pertaining to the content of the contract 
and its meaning were in her possession. She testified as 
follows: 
"Q. Well, you knew that there was no 
reference to oil and gas reservations in that 
document, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Yet after the reading of the docu-
ment and the passing of it around and all of 
you observing its contents you affixed your 
signature to the document, did you not, Mrs. 
Pace? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You made no effort to make any pen-
cil or pen interlineation to include a reserva-
tion of oil and gas rights, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you made no suggestions that 
the document be retyped or modified in any 
way at that time, did you? 
A. I though it was understood— 
Q. I said, you made no suggestion of 
that kind? 
A. No 
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Q. That was in 1965, September 8th? 
A. Right." (R. 104) 
and again: 
"Q. You were aware very early in the 
proceedings of the failure to have the reserva-
tion of oil and gas rights in the document were 
you not? 
A. I was aware that it should have been 
in there before I ever signed it/' (R. 110) 
It is also interesting to note that when the Extension 
to this Lease Sales Contraot was presented to her on 
May 22, 1967 (Ex. 16), she read the document and 
signed it without making any request for any changes. 
Mrs. Pace testified as follows: 
"A. I went with him to the lady's house 
that made it up. 
Q. I am sorry. I had forgotten. The two 
of you went to the lady's house who made it up, 
and at that particular time you read it, did you 
not? 
A. Yes, I read it. 
Q. You understood its contents, did you ? 
A. I did. 
Q. And you placed your signature on 
that document? 
A. I did. 
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Q. And you voluntarily at that time were 
willing to grant the extension that is provided 
by the content of the document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You may answer that yes or no. 
MR. B O Y D E N : Dont' stop her. 
MR. BLACK: I want a yes or no 
answer. 
A. I said yes, sir. 
Q. (By Mr. Black) There is not a men-
tion in that document of any reservation of oil 
and gas rights to you, is that not true? 
A. That is true." (R. 105) 
The above testimony further establishes the fact that 
defendant was guilty of a form of negligence that under 
the cases defeats her defense of fraud. Such neglect simp-
ly demonstrates that she had no right of reliance what-
soever on any representations on the part of plaintiff 
regarding oil and gas rights. 
Once again it is interesting to note that there is no 
direct evidence that defendant ever placed any reliance 
on the claimed oral representations of plaintiff. 
In the case of Migliaccio v. Continental Mining and 
Milling Co., 196 F. 2d 398 (C. A. 10, 1952), the Tenth 
Circuit Coin* of Appeals states that before one can have 
relief from a claimed fraud, he must not only show that 
he relied, but that he had a right to rely. That right of 
reliance does not exist where he is put on notice. 
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"Knowledge which is sufficient to lead a 
prudent person to inquire about the matter 
when it could have been ascertained conven-
iently, constitutes notice of whatever the in-
quiry would have disclosed, and will be re-
garded as knowledge of the facts." Columbian 
Nafl Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 116 F.2d 705. 
Element 9: His consequent and proximate injury. 
It is necessary in any fraud action for the person 
daiming the fraud to demonstrate by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that he has suffered damages. It cannot 
merely be a "fraud in the air." Roosevelt v. Missouri 
State Life Insurance Co., 78 F. 2d 752 (C. C. A. 8, 1935). 
In the case of Smith v. Belles, 132 U. S. 125, 10 S, 
Ct. 39, the Court stated: 
"According to this theory, the question is 
not what the plaintiff might have gained, but 
what he had lost by being deceived into the pur-
chase; the defendant is liable to respond in 
such damages as naturally and proximately re-
sult from the fraud; he is bound to make good 
the loss sustained—such moneys as the plain-
tiff has paid out, with interest, and any other 
outlay legitimately attributable to the de-
fendant's fraudulent conduct—but this liabil-
ity does not include the expectant fruits of an 
unrealized speculation, (emphasis added) 
See also: Morris v. U. S., 303 F. 2d 533 (C. C. A. 10, 
1962); Rummell v. Bailey, 7 U. 2d 137, 320 P. 2d 653, 
(1958); Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Flint, 66 Utah 128, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
240 P. 175, (1925); Kirmear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 
P. 2d 1094 (1932); Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, etc., 303 F. 2d 527 (10 C. C. A. 
1962); Bryant, et al. v. Vaughn, et al., 33 S. W. 2d 729 
(Tex. 1939); Toshnek, et al. v. Hefner, et ux., 282 S. W. 
2d 298 (Tex. App. 1955); Bauder v. Johnson, 36 S. W. 
2d 1112 (Tex. App. 1931). 
We also point out that there is no evidence as to 
present value of the oil and gas rights and consequently, 
no evidence as to defendant's injury. Defendant has 
simply failed to discharge her burden of proof on this 
element. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT SUSTAINED HER 
BURDEN OF PROVING MUTUAL MIS-
TAKE OF FACT BY CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING EVIDENCE AND THAT THE 
NEGLECT OF DEFENDANT WAS EXCUS-
ABLE. 
The trial court in its Conclusions of Law states: 
" 1 . Defendant had sustained her burden 
of persuasion by clear satisfactory, definite 
and convincing evidence that at the time of the 
execution of the Lease Option, neither plain-
tiffs nor defendant intended to create an in-
terest in plaintiffs in the oil, gas and mineral 
estate in the subject property and that the fail-
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ure of said Lease Option to contain such a res-
ervation was due to mutual mistake of the 
parties. 
2. Under the circumstances prevailing at 
the time the Lease Option Agreement was ex-
ecuted, said mutual mistake was not the result 
of any inexcusable neglect." 
It is the contention of plaintiffs that defendant clear-
ly failed to sustain her burden of showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake of 
feet. 
A. Burden of Proof. 
As with the defense of fraud, the burden is on the 
defendant to prove each and every element of mutual 
mistake of fact by clear and convincing evidence. See: 
Kirchgestner v. D. & R. G. W. Railroad Co., 118 Utah 
41,233 P. 2d 699, (1951). 
B. The legal principles applicable. 
The necessary elements to establish a mutual mistake 
of fact on which a party may obtain relief are set forth 
in the annotation appearing at 59 A. L. R. 809. The 
annotation states: 
"Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is 
frequently given by a reformation of the con-
tract. But a contract will not be reformed for 
a unilateral mistake. Equitable relief may, 
however, be given from a unilateral mistake by 
a recission of the contract. Essential conditions 
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to such relief are (1) the mistake must be of 
so grave a consequence that to enforce the con-
tract as actually made would be unconscion-
able. (2) the matter as to which the mistake 
was made must relate to a material feature of 
the contract. (3) generally the mistake must 
have occurred nothwithstanding the exercise 
of ordinary diligence by the party making the 
mistake. (4) it must be possible to give relief 
by way of recision without serious prejudice 
to the other party except the loss of his bargain. 
In other words, it must be possible to put him 
in a status quo." 
The leading Utah case on mutual mistake of fact m 
Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 U. 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620, (1957), 
where it is stated: 
"There are numerous cases in this juris-
diction dealing with reformation of an instru-
ment on the ground of mutual mistake. The 
guiding criteria are well established. Mutual 
mistake of fact may be defined as error in re-
ducing the concurring intentions of the parties 
to writing, (case cited) Evidence necessary to 
substantiate mutual mistake of fact must be 
clear, definite and convincing, and the parties 
seeking reformation should not be guilty of 
negligence in the execution of the contract or 
deed or laches in making timely application for 
its reformation. This principle has consistently 
been applied in equity cases throughout the re-
formation of instrument cases" (cases cited) 
(emphasis added) 
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See also: Ellison v. Johnson, 18 U. 2d 374, 423 P. 
2d 657, (1967). 
Again, it is the contention of plaintiffs in this action 
that it is completely inconsistent for one to say that there 
was a mistake when he himself understood very clearly 
the omission from a contract of an element of the Agree-
ment at the time that the Contract was executed by the 
parties. At the very least, the elements indicated above 
would require that the one claiming a mistake, in fact, 
be mistaken. That is not the case here. 
It is essential to point out that the mistake be mutual 
and as to a material fact, and that the party seeking to 
set aside a written instrument as a result of such a mis-
take clearly establish that he or she is free from neglect 
in connection with such a mistake. (The issue of ma-
teriality was discussed previously in Rwnt IV.) If there 
was a mistake in this case, defendant was grossly negli-
gent in allowing the mistake to be perpetuated by the 
written Lease Sales Agreement, and again when the ex-
tension agreement was granted. On each of these occa-
sions the defendant read the documents in question, fully 
understood their contents, knew that they did not re-
serve to her any oil, gas or mineral rights, and neverthe-
less placed her signature upon them. That she was 
grossly negligent in letting the years roll by without 
reforming the contract becomes obvious when we allude 
once again to her testimony. 
"Q. You were aware very early in the pro-
ceedings of the failure to have the reser-
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vation of the oil and gas rights in the 
document, were you not? 
A. I was aware that it should have been in 
there before I ever signed it." (R. 110) 
The tenor of the position of the Utah Supreme Court 
and the general law in this area of contracts is best cited 
in the case of Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, Inc., 
234 P. 2d 842, (1951), wherein 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, 
Section 137, pp. 628-629, is cited approvingly as follows: 
"Ignorance of the contents of an instru-
ment does not ordinarily affect the liability of 
one who signs it. * * * If a man acts negligent-
ly and in such a way as to justify others in sup-
posing that the writing is assented to by him, 
he will be bound both at law and in equity, 
even though he supposes the writing is an in-
strument of an entirely different character. 
The courts appear to be unanimous in hold-
ing that a person who, having the capacity and 
an opportunity to read a contract, is not mis-
led as to its contents and who sustains no con-
fidential relationship to the other party cannot 
avoid the contract on the ground of mistake if 
he signs it without reading it at least in the ab-
sence of special circumstances excusing his 
failure to read it. If the contract is plain and 
unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound 
thereby. * * * To permit a party, when sued on 
a written contract, to admit that he signed it 
but to deny that it expresses the agreement he 
made or to allow him to admit that he signed 
it but did not read it or know its stipulations 
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would absolutely destroy the value of all con-
tracts. The purpose of the rule is to give stabil-
ity to written agreements and to remove the 
temptation and possibility of perjury, which 
would be afforded '1 parol evidence were ad-
missible. * * *" 
This statement of law becomes all the more forceful 
in the case at bar when it is understood that defendant 
read and understood the contract and was not deceived 
in any way as to the contract's contents. By defendant's 
own admission, there was nothing in that contract she 
did not understand. (R. 104) Of equal importance is 
that a party who signs a contract is to be considered 
bound by a knowledge of its contents. Thews v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., supra. 
The above statements of law apply to general con-
tract law. But it should not be forgotten in this case 
that this is a conveyance of real property which places 
the added burden on defendant to comply with the Stat-
ute of Frauds. (Discussed in Point III.) 
Utah law has long recognized the rule that equity 
will not cancel an instrument on the ground of mistake 
of law or fraudulent misrepresentation of law. In Acker-
man v. Branmwell Investment Co., 80 Utah 52, 12 P. 2d 
623, (1932), the court said: 
"The general rule is that misrepresenta-
tions of law or of the legal effect of contracts 
and writings does not constitute remedial 
fraud." 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERUED IN RULING 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND 
LACHES FROM ASSERTING ANY RIGHTS 
TO THE OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS. 
A. The Statute of Limitations issue was timely 
raised. 
The Statute of Limitations provisions of 78-12-25 
and 72-12-26(3), U. C. A. 1953, as amended; the Statute 
of Frauds, 25-5-1 et seq., U. C. A. 1953, as amended, and 
the theories of estoppel and laches have been raised in 
an equitable, timely manner, giving adequate notice to 
counsel for the defendant by means of a letter and Mem-
orandum sent to John Paul Kennedy, counsol for de-
fendant, and filed with the court on the 21st day of June, 
1974. 
With regard to the Statute of Limitations issue, we 
call attention to Rule 7(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We set forth the rule for the convenience of 
the Court. 
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM 
OF MOTIONS 
"(a) Pleadings. There shall be a com-
plaint and an answer; a reply to a counter-
claim denominated as such. * * * No other 
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party 
answer!' (Emphasis added) 
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Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§§1182,1184, in discussing Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which is identical with Utah Rule 
7(a), explains the rule: 
"The purpose underlying the rule that a 
reply is necessary only if the counterclaim is 
designated as such is to avoid problems arising 
out of the similarity between certain counter-
claims and affirmative defenses as well as to 
provide a clear guideline for the pleader to 
enable him to determine when he must serve a 
reply. Thus, if the answer does not contain a 
denominated counterclaim, a reply is not re-
quired and in theory not permitted, although 
the Court is given extensive discretion by Rule 
8(c) to allow a reply by treating a counter-
claim that is misdesignated as a defense as 
though it were properly designated and to im-
pose any terms it deems appropriate on the 
correction of the mistake. The court also may 
resolve any confusion caused by misdesignation 
by ordering the pleader to clarify his answer 
to indicate whether certain allegations are in-
tended as defenses or counterclaims. If a party 
labels as a counterclaim matter that actually 
constitutes a defense, a reply technically is 
improper because there is no counterclaim in 
fact, although it is difficult to perceive of any 
significant sanction befalling the pleader 
should he actually interpose a reply . . ." 
§§ H84. 
«* * * Thus, the function of a pleading in 
federal practice is to inform a party of the na-
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ture of the claims and defenses being asserted 
against him and the relief demanded by his ad-
versary. The rules reflect a realization that 
the supposed effectiveness of pleadings in nar-
rowing and defining the issues is largely a 
myth, this function being more effectively per-
formed by discovery, summary judgment, and 
pretrial conferences." §§ 1182. 
See also: Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 2A §§7.00 to 
7.06. 
It is also clear that this is the rule in Utah when it 
is plaintiffs rather than defendants who are asserting 
the applicable section of the Statute of Limitations. See: 
Hansen v. Morris, 2 U. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884, 886, (1955), 
where the court stated: 
"As to the contention that the limitations 
statute was not pleaded and hence was waived: 
We concede that statutes of limitations gener-
ally must be pleaded. Such principle usually 
applies to defendants only. In our instant case 
we have the unique situation where such a stat-
ute must be pleaded by the plaintiff. Under 
Rule 8(c) statutes of limitations must be plead-
ed and at first blush it would appear that 
plaintiff is bound by such rule. However, an 
anomaly is presented where, as here, plaintiff 
must assert the statute, since the only pleading 
available to him would be a reply, a pleading 
unauthorized under Rule 7(a) as a matter of 
right, except in attacking a counterclaim, and 
which can only be filed by order of the court. 
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Hence, it is obvious that Rule 8(c), in logic 
and good sense cannot hold a plaintiff seeking 
to assert a statute to knock out a defense, to 
the same strict accountability that it can a de-
fendant seeking to knock out a claim" 
See also: Thomas v. Brafetfs Heirs, 6 U. 2d 57, 305 P. 
2d 507, (1956). 
Based on the above authorities, the issue of the 
Statute of Limitations was properly before the Court. 
B. The Utah three year Statute of Limitations cov-
ering fraud and mutual mistake of fact had lapsed both 
on the Lease-Sales Contract of September 8, 1965, and 
the Lease Extension executed on May 22, 1967, before 
defendant first asserted any claim of fraud or mistake. 
Defendant signed the Lease Option Agreement in 
1965 (Ex. 2); signed an agreement extending the Option 
in 1967 (Ex. 16); and did not raise her defenses of fraud 
and mutual mistake until after the filing of this lawsuit 
in 1972, These basic facts bring the Statute of Limita-
tions into the fore as a valid and important issue when 
taken in the light of a long line of cases stating the law 
in Utah. In Horn v. Daniel, 315 F. 2d 471, (C. C. A. 10, 
1962), plaintiff brought an action to set aside a deed 
covering a grantor's interest in mining claims on the 
ground of fraud on the part of the grantee. The court 
found for defendant holding that the Statute of Limita-
tions had run in view of the fact that the grantor had 
all of the information necessary for the discovery of the 
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fraud before him during the entire period of the statute. 
The court stated: 
"Thus it appears that Horn's present 
claim of injury in 1957 found its motive in the 
subsequent years, and conduct previously ap-
proved finds taint through the consequence 
of later values. The evidence supports the trial 
court's finding that Horn was sufficiently 
apprised of his cause of action prior to October 
17, 1957, and was in possession of all facts 
which would lead an experienced mining man 
to conclude that Daniel had negotiated with 
Newmont. The law does not favor one who 
withholds a purported interest in a mining en-
terprise awaiting favorable results, (case 
cited) the time of discovery of the existence of 
fraud is a question of fact, (case cited) and the 
possession of all information necessary to dis-
cover fraud satisfied the requirements of the 
Utah Statute, (cases cited) 
See also: Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 U. 2d 159, 349 
P. 2d 1112, (1960); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake In-
vestment Co., 43 Utah 181,194,134 P. 603, (1913); Weight 
v. BaUey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899, (1915); Reese Howell 
Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, (1916); Gibson v. 
Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426, (1916); Smith v. Ed-
wards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 264, (1932). 
The Horn decision, supra, was made in light of the 
three year Utah Statute of Limitations governing fraud 
which states in part: 
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" . . . the cause of action in such case shall 
not be deemed to have accrued until the discov-
ery by the aggrieved party of the facts consti-
tuting the fraud or mistake." U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, Sec. 78-12-26(3). 
The law in Utah on this point is best summarized 
in the case of Taylor v. Moore, et al., 87 Utah 493, 51 
P. 2d 222, (1935), as cited in Migliaccio v. Continental 
Mining and Milling Co., supra, where it is stated: 
"And, Utah courts have said that 'A party 
who has opportunity of knowing the facts con-
stituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive 
and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that 
arose by reason of his own laches and negli-
gence.' " 
See also: Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Company, 
23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208, 17A, C. J. S., Sec. 448, Page 560; 
37 Am. Jur. 2d 555. 
Other cases have referred to that "opportunity of 
knowing" as notice. The case of Columbian National 
Life Insurance Co. v. Rogers, supra, is worth requoting 
on that issue. The court there said: 
"Knowledge which is sufficient to lead a 
prudent person to inquire about the matter 
when it could have been ascertained conven-
iently, constitutes notice of whatever the in-
quiry would have disclosed, and will be regard-
ed as knowledge of the facts." 
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The case at bar is of greater impact. The defendant 
was beyond the point of inquiry because she "knew" 
there was no reservation whatsoever contained in the 
contract. 
McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P. 2d 801, (1974), is the 
most recent holding of the Supreme Court of Utah con-
cerning the issue of the Statute of Limitations. The facts 
of that case are strikingly similar to those before the 
court in the instant matter. In that case the original 
purchasers from the defendant assigned their interest 
under a purchase contract to the plaintiffs. In the original 
purchase contract between the defendant and the pur-
chasers, the defendant reserved the mineral rights to 
himself and his wife. Such reservation was recorded on 
Warranty Deeds that were deposited with an escrow. 
In November of 1960, plaintiffs and the defendants en-
tered into a real estate contract which corrected and 
amended some of the conditions of the real estate con-
tract between the defendants and the original purchasers. 
This contract contained no reservation of mineral rights. 
In December of 1960, the defendants had their attorney 
prepare two Warranty Deeds to replace the original 
Warranty Deed, and these new deeds contained the res-
ervation of the mineral interests. In 1964, plaintiffs 
negotiated for a loan with Travelers Insurance Company. 
At the same time they paid to the escrow the balance due 
on the contract and directed the escrow holder to deliver 
the Warranty Deeds to Security Title Company for title 
insurance. The court below was affirmed in its determ-
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ination that the Statute of Limitations had run against 
the plaintiffs in the following language: 
"The court below found that the plaintiffs 
had full opportunity to discover the reserva-
tions in the deeds when the deeds were de-
livered to Security Title Company and when 
they reviewed problems in the chain of title. 
That all of the circumstances existing at or 
about the time the deeds were recorded were 
such as to furnish full opportunity to the plain-
tiffs for the discovery of the mistake or fraud, 
if any existed. The court further found that 
more than eight years had elapsed since the 
time for reasonable inquiry on the part of the 
plaintiffs would have revealed the mistake or 
fraud to the time of filing their complaint. The 
trial court concluded that the claims of the 
plaintiffs are barred by the Statutes of Limita-
tions above referred to." 
The case at bar, one more time, is stronger in its 
facts than is McCoknie v. Hartman, supra. The defen-
dant admits knowledge of the lack of reservation of the 
oil, gas and mineral rights in the contract. 
Also, restatements of a fraudulent misrepresentation 
or a mutual mistake by one who originally made it, after 
the party has been put on a duty of inquiry, do not of 
themselves constitute concealment excusing delay in 
bringing an action for the damages thereby occasioned. 
See: Feak v. Marion Steam Shovel Company, 84 F. 2d 
670 (C. A. 9, 1936); 70 A. L. R. 942 (Examination of 
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real property before entering into a contract precludes 
recission on grounds of falsity of representations); 107 
A. L. R. 589. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF ACQUIESCED IN 
ACCEPTING THE RETURN OF THE MON-
EY OFFERED AS TENDER IN COMPLE-
TION OF THE LEASE-SALES CONTRACT. 
The Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
states: 
"Even if plaintiff properly exercised a 
valid option, he later acquiesced to its rejection 
by the defendant." 
In factual support of the foregoing proposition, coun-
sel cited Exhibit 10, a letter from Reid Bench to Emia 
Pace, dated June 15, 1971. Plaintiff contends that propo-
sition should be rejected for several reasons. 
To begin, the language of the Lease-Sales Contract 
makes it clear the writing was complete and unambiguous 
on its face. (Ex. 2) The contract contained an easy to 
understand option to purchase which could be exercised 
by simply making a $2,000.00 down payment. When the 
time came for the exercise of the option, the down pay-
ment was made and accepted without question or reser-
vation. (R. 106) Although the defendant claimed that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
there was a discussion at the time of tender concerning 
a future contract for the sale of the property (R. 89), 
nothing was put in writing and no additional considera-
tion was exchanged. Therefore, no valid alteration was 
made to the clear and unambiguous terms of the original 
Lease-Sales Contract. At that point, all that was re-
quired to purchase the land had taken places, but for 
continued payments as per the original Lease-Sales Con-
tract. Several months later the defendant attempted to 
append conditions to the option not contained in the 
original contract including the requirement of an escrow 
(Ex. 6) and the reservation of mineral rights. 
Next, the letter of Mr. Beaslin, dated April 5, 1971, 
with all due respect, is at the least forceful in nature. 
It reads in part as follows: 
"Also, pursuant to the Escrow Agreement, 
which Mr. Sam prepared, and which you have 
a copy of, would have to be executed, or, you 
will merely continue on with the lease until the 
same expires by its terms, which would be Sep-
tember 15, of 1973." 
The letter goes on to state: 
"If you want to exercise the option to purchase >• 
the property, then it will be necessary that 
you either sign the Escrow Agreement and 
place the same at the bank, together with a deed 
from Mrs. Pace to be delivered upon the pay-
ment of the contract amount in full, or, it will 
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be construed that you have not in fact bought 
the property." 
The proposed escrow agreement, contrary to the 
terms of the contract, contained a reservation of oil and 
gas rights. Mr. Bench, without benefit of legal counsel, 
responded to the Beaslin letter and stated: 
"I agreed to lease the property with an option 
to purchase and the terms of said purchase 
were agreed upon by both Owners and Lessee. 
I have not signed the papers prepared by Mr. 
Sam because these terms are being changed." 
(See Exhibit 8.) 
Defendant has claimed the original lease-option 
agreement in this case contains numerous ambiguities, 
including the nature of title and extent of interest. This 
condusory daim is unsupportable by specifics or case 
law to show that any ambiguity in fact exists in said 
document. As we pointed out in oral argument there are 
no ambiguities in the contract. There was no need of an 
escrow. Payments following the exercise of the option 
could have been made directly to the seller just as they 
were before the exercise of the option. It is true that an 
escrow holder could have received a deed from Mrs. Pace 
to await final payment but it would have been just as 
easy for her to make out a deed and hold it herself to 
await the final payment. 
The settlement negotiations which resulted are listed 
below and serve to underscore the fact that the plaintiff 
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in no way acquiesced in the rejection of his tender under 
the sales option. It will be recalled that the $2,000.00 
had been returned by Mrs, Pace on June 2, 1971, and the 
option exercise repudiated. 
First, the plaintiff's letter of June 15, 1971, (Ex. 10) 
contains the following language: 
"I t is only our desire and intention to pur-
chase the farm as per our original lease pur-
chase agreement and the terms there outlined. 
Let's get together and iron out the difference." 
This language cannot be interpreted as an acquies-
cence in the repudiation of the option. Rather, that 
language clearly shows the plaintiff was never willing to 
accept the refunded money and abandon his rights under 
the contract. 
Second, plaintiff, after writing the aforementioned 
letter, continued to attempt, as best he could, to com-
promise the difficulty he had come to realize existed 
between the parties to the contract. (R. 129) Though 
these attempts failed, they certainly served as notice 
to Mrs. Pace that the plaintiff, again, did not acquiesce 
in the rejection. 
Third, with the realization that his attempts to com-
promise had failed, Mr. Bench filed this action on No-
vember 30, 1972. This filing came at a point in time 
sufficiently close to the June 15, 1971, letter and the 
subsequent failure to compromise so as to give notice 
to Mrs. Pace that the plaintiff did not acquiesce in the 
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repudiation of his attempted exercise of the option. It 
is well established that specific performance is an equit-
able remedy. It is also well established that equity aids 
the vigilant and refuses to help those who sleep on their 
rights to the prejudice of the party against whom relief 
is sought. 71 Am. Jur. 2d 126-127. 
As is apparent from the factual sequence of events 
stressed herein, plaintiff was not guilty of acquiescence 
in the defendant's rejection nor is he guilty of unreason-
able delay, which might prejudice the defendant, in the 
commencement of this action. The plaintiff acted at 
all times in such a manner as to give notice that he 
rightfully expected his option and tender to be honored 
according to the written agreement between the parties. 
We also point out to the Court that at the time the 
lawsuit was filed, plaintiff was still within the time for 
exercising his option. The case was filed on November 
30, 1972, and the option period would not expire until 
September 15, 1973. In the Complaint, plaintiffs ask for 
specific performance of the contract including the right 
to exercise his option. Certainly, it was apparent by this 
time that the formal handing of $2,000.00 once again to 
the defendant would have been to no avail, and the law 
has never required the performance of a useless act. 
We cite Williston on Contracts, 3rd ed. Vol. 15, p. 447, 
as follows: 
"Section 1819 . . . W A I V E R O F OB-
J E C T I O N TO T E N D E R . Under general 
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principles previously discussed, tender is ex-
cused by obstruction or prevention or imposi-
tion of unwarranted conditions by the person 
to whom it is to be made. So where the obligee 
has manifested to the obligor that tender, if 
made, will not be accepted, the obligor is ex-
cused from making tender as it would be at 
most merely a futile gesture." 
Counsel calls attention to a document he calls "An 
oil lease disclaimer . . . " That is not the title of the docu-
ment. The title of the document is "Proof of Possession." 
(Ex. 12) The Court should note that such document was 
placed before plaintiff for signature long after the rights 
and obligations of the parties had become fixed. He 
agreed to sign the document only after attorney Mangan 
had assured ham that his rights, pursuant to the original 
contract, including his oil and gas rights, would not in 
any way be jeopardized. (R. 136, 141) 
POINT VIII. 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PRODUCE 
HER SON AARON AT TRIAL IS A MATER-
IAL FAILURE IN HER OVERALL BURDEN 
OF PROOF. 
At this point it is interesting to note that the de-
fendant held the property as a tenant in common with 
Aaron Pace, her son. The signatures of both appear on 
the Lease-Sales Contract. At no time was Aaron Pace 
called to testify, however, concerning the original signing 
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of the Lease-Sales Contract here in question. Since Mr. 
Pace was a party to the events at issue, one must con-
clude that he was not misled or mistaken concerning the 
Lease-Sales Contract and its contents. If Mr. Pace was 
was not a party to the same misunderstandings as the 
defendant, one must conclude defendant has not me£ 
her evidentiary burden of establishing fraud or mistake 
by "clear and convincing,, evidence. (See Points IV and 
V on Fraud and Mistake.) If one cotenant is misled or 
mistaken, while another is not, the evidence does not 
reach the point of being "clear and ronvineing." This 
is especially true where Aaron was in a confidential re-
lationship with defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The turning point of this case centers around one 
question to and answer of defendant on cross-examination. 
"Q. You were aware very early in the 
proceedings of the failure to have the reserva-
tion of oil and gas rights in the document, were 
you not? 
A. I was aware that it should have been 
in there before I ever signed it." 
On the fraud issue of right of reliance, if defendant 
was aware of the omission of the oil and gas rights res-
ervation in the contract and also of the further fact that 
"it should have been in there," she had no right to rely 
on any misrepresentations made by plaintiff, even assum-
ing such to exist. On the mutual mistake of fact issue, 
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said testimony condusively demonstrates that defendant 
was not mistaken either as to the absence of a reserva-
tion of oil and gas rights in the contract or of the im-
portance of its omission in said document, because she 
admitted voluntarily and not as a result of a leading 
question that, "I was aware that it should have been in 
there . . ." 
The case law we have cited in this brief 
places the legal burden on a party claiming a mutual 
mistake of fact of comporting himself in a non-negligent 
manner. Defendant was plainly and simply guilty of 
negligence in not taking timely steps to reform the in-
strument, knowing that the reservation of oil and gas 
rights, "should have been in there." 
On the Statute of Limitations and Laches issue, the 
three year period began to run when defendant either 
knew or should have known that the contract did not 
reserve the oil and gas rights which she now claims. Her 
unequivocal admission that she knew the reservation of 
said rights was not set forth in the contract and further-
more that said reservation "should have been in there" 
before she ever signed the contract, started the Statute 
running and precludes the defenses of fraud and mistake. 
As has been explained on the issue of tender, after 
defendant's acceptance of plaintiffs' tender, the respec-
tive rights, duties and obligations of the parties were 
fixed by the terms of the Lease Sales Contract. Any 
negotiations subsequent thereto were simply attempts 
to settle a disputed claim. Defendant's repudiation of 
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the tender was unequivocal leaving no doubt of her in-
tent not to honor the terms of the Lease Sales Con-
tract. Therefore, plaintiffs were left with no alternative 
to commencing this action. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully sub-
mitted to the Court that the judgment of the court 
below should be reversed and plaintiffs should be granted 
the specific performance prayed for in their Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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